{"version":"1.0","provider_name":"Leibniz Institut f\u00fcr Medienforschung | Leibniz Institute for Media Research","provider_url":"https:\/\/leibniz-hbi.de\/en\/","title":"Elections in a Fortified Platform Democracy","type":"rich","width":600,"height":338,"html":"<blockquote class=\"wp-embedded-content\" data-secret=\"Q5OfMeIzi3\"><a href=\"https:\/\/leibniz-hbi.de\/en\/hbi-publications\/elections-in-a-fortified-platform-democracy\/\">Elections in a Fortified Platform Democracy<\/a><\/blockquote><iframe sandbox=\"allow-scripts\" security=\"restricted\" src=\"https:\/\/leibniz-hbi.de\/en\/hbi-publications\/elections-in-a-fortified-platform-democracy\/embed\/#?secret=Q5OfMeIzi3\" width=\"600\" height=\"338\" title=\"&#8220;Elections in a Fortified Platform Democracy&#8221; &#8212; Leibniz Institut f\u00fcr Medienforschung | Leibniz Institute for Media Research\" data-secret=\"Q5OfMeIzi3\" frameborder=\"0\" marginwidth=\"0\" marginheight=\"0\" scrolling=\"no\" class=\"wp-embedded-content\"><\/iframe><script>\n\/*! This file is auto-generated *\/\n!function(d,l){\"use strict\";l.querySelector&&d.addEventListener&&\"undefined\"!=typeof URL&&(d.wp=d.wp||{},d.wp.receiveEmbedMessage||(d.wp.receiveEmbedMessage=function(e){var t=e.data;if((t||t.secret||t.message||t.value)&&!\/[^a-zA-Z0-9]\/.test(t.secret)){for(var s,r,n,a=l.querySelectorAll('iframe[data-secret=\"'+t.secret+'\"]'),o=l.querySelectorAll('blockquote[data-secret=\"'+t.secret+'\"]'),c=new RegExp(\"^https?:$\",\"i\"),i=0;i<o.length;i++)o[i].style.display=\"none\";for(i=0;i<a.length;i++)s=a[i],e.source===s.contentWindow&&(s.removeAttribute(\"style\"),\"height\"===t.message?(1e3<(r=parseInt(t.value,10))?r=1e3:~~r<200&&(r=200),s.height=r):\"link\"===t.message&&(r=new URL(s.getAttribute(\"src\")),n=new URL(t.value),c.test(n.protocol))&&n.host===r.host&&l.activeElement===s&&(d.top.location.href=t.value))}},d.addEventListener(\"message\",d.wp.receiveEmbedMessage,!1),l.addEventListener(\"DOMContentLoaded\",function(){for(var e,t,s=l.querySelectorAll(\"iframe.wp-embedded-content\"),r=0;r<s.length;r++)(t=(e=s[r]).getAttribute(\"data-secret\"))||(t=Math.random().toString(36).substring(2,12),e.src+=\"#?secret=\"+t,e.setAttribute(\"data-secret\",t)),e.contentWindow.postMessage({message:\"ready\",secret:t},\"*\")},!1)))}(window,document);\n\/\/# sourceURL=https:\/\/leibniz-hbi.de\/wp-includes\/js\/wp-embed.min.js\n<\/script>\n","thumbnail_url":"https:\/\/leibniz-hbi.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/02\/page_dummy_publikationen.jpg","thumbnail_width":1380,"thumbnail_height":400,"description":"The integrity of the German parliamentary elections and future European elections has been and continues to be threatened by influence peddling via social networks. The Digital Services Act (DSA) is supposed to provide a remedy against election manipulation. In a blog post on the Verfassungsblog, Jan-Ole Harfst explains why Art. 34-35 of the DSA could hardly remedy the systemic risks of this federal election campaign."}