The integrity of the German parliamentary elections and future European elections has been and continues to be threatened by influence peddling via social networks. The Digital Services Act (DSA) is supposed to provide a remedy against election manipulation. In a blog post on the Verfassungsblog, Jan-Ole Harfst explains why Art. 34-35 of the DSA could hardly remedy the systemic risks of this federal election campaign.
The EU’s Digital Services Act (DSA), which only came into full effect in 2024, focuses on online platforms and their content moderation – but can it also remedy the systemic risks of the current election campaign? The online platforms themselves seem only partially prepared, and the flexibility and open-endedness of the DSA rules suggest that they will provide a long-term solution rather than a quick fix.
In his blog post, Jan-Ole Harfst first discusses three ways in which campaign discourse is influenced, which are increasingly transnational. He then shows that the DSA cannot counter the systemic risks of electoral manipulation in the short term, with one exception that has its own problems.